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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
KENNETH SHARP , 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15915 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a criminal proceeding in which the 
appellant was charged and convicted of Burglary in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202(1) (1953 as amended), a Second Degree Felony. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted of the crime of Burglary as 
defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202(1), a Second Degree Felony. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and sentence 
imposed by the lower court. Appellant further seeks the case to 
be remanded for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 22, 1977, a Complaint was issued by the Justice 
of the Peace, Stanley Leavitt, the Justice Court, Kamas Precinct, 
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Summit County, State of Utah. The Complaint charged the appellant, 
Kenneth V. Sharp, with the crime of Burglary, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-202(1) (1953 as amended) (R. 1). After a prelimina: 
hearing the appellant was charged by an Information filed on Januar; 
5, 1978, alleging the aforementioned offense in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Summit County, State of Utah (R. 4). 
On April 6, 1978, a trial was held before the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge presiding. The appellant made an 
intelligent waiver of the jury and the case was heard before Judge 
Hanson, Jr. as the trier of the fact (R. 36). The appellant was 
found guilty as charged in the Information on April 6, 1978. The 
appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one to 
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. 
At the trial the State called Mr. Kenneth Rogerson, a 
security guard for Pines Ranch (R. 38). Mr. Rogerson testified 
he observed the appellant and another person leaving the Pines 
Ranch area. Mr. Rogerson told the two people to leave the Ranch, 
which they did (R. 44). 
Mr. Rogerson then continued and inspected the area. He 
observed the Cornwall cabin, the cabin alleged in the Information, 
with the door open and a pane of broken glass in it (R. 45) · He 
also testified the nearby tool shed door was open and a snowmobile 
in the area had its cover off and the cowl was open (R. 44-45). 
Over objection the trial court allowed the State to 
examine this witness about his further observations that day of 
- 2 -
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other cabins in the area. The trial court allowed the witness' 
testimony of other alleged break-ins at Pines Ranch for the purpose 
of intent, modus operendi, or general scheme or plan subject to a 
motion to strike (R. 49-53). 
Mr. Rogerson testified there were fresh footprints in 
the snow leading to several other cabins. He stated these other 
cabins, not alleged in the Information, appeared to be burglarized 
and in a general state of disaray. 
The State next called Mr. Daniel Allen, previously a co-
defendant in the instant case (R. 99). Mr. Allen pleaded guilty 
to a lesser degree of burglary, a third degree felony (R. 99). 
Sentence was pending at the time he testified in the instant case 
(R. 119). Mr. Allen testified that the appellant did not enter the 
Cornwall cabin (R. 97,99,108,115) and he was unsure if the appellant 
entered the adjacent tool shed (R. 106). Mr. Allen further testi-
fied that he was the only one who attempted to start the nearby 
snowmobile (R. 107). 
Over the continuing objection of defense counsel (R. 99), 
Mr. Allen testified he and the appellant entered some other cabins 
in the area. However, he further testified the appellant did not 
remove any items from any of the cabins (R. 123). 
Defense counsel's renewed motion to strike was overruled 
(R. 156-159) and the evidence was received to show a plan, motive, 
opportunity and absence of mistake. 
- 3 -
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ARGUMENT 
THE APPELLANT CONTENDS THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF OTHER ALLEGED CRIMINAL ACTS 
BY THE APPELLANT. 
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of other 
alleged criminal acts by the appellant. The appellant further 
contends the erroneous ruling is due solely to the trial court's 
inability to apply the amorphous "balancing test" concept enunciate! 
in Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence. Therefore, the appellant re- 1 
quests this Court to adopt a more lucid formula when balancing the 
probative worth and the prejudicial effect of evidence of other 
crimes. 
Several sound policy reasons support the adoption of a 
new formula. However, to fully evaluate this rational, it is necm 
ary to view the historical development of admission of evidence of 
prior criminal acts. 
Traditionally, an accused's past criminal history has bee: 
reviewed suspiciously by American courts. This distrust is also 
evidenced in the Utah Code Ann. §78-24-9 (1953 as amended), where 
the state legislature prohibited examination concerning prior mis· 
demeanor convictions. 
A major reason for distrust is the fear that the trier of 
fact will be prejudiced against the accused by introduction of sud~ 
evidence. The result of this prejudice is manifested in several 
- 4 -
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ways. First, the evidence indicates the defendant coim!litted another 
unpunished crime or he is a "bad man" and should be punished regard-
less of his present guilt. Second, a tendency exists to infer that, 
if the defendant committed a previous crime, he probably coim!litted 
the crime charged. Recognizing these consequences, American courts 
generally exclude evidence of other crimes. State v. Scott, 111 
Utah 9, 21-22, 175 P.2d 1016, 1022 (1947). 
However, in some instances, evidence of other crimes is 
extremely probative. For example, in sexual offense cases, often 
the criminal conduct has particular characteristics identifying the 
assailant. It is these circumstances which require the trial court 
to balance the probative value of the evidence submitted against the 
prejudice. 
Although all jurisdictions prohibit other crimes evidence 
1 
to show a criminal propensity, the approach in admitting certain 
previous criminal acts varies according to the jurisdiction. In 
Utah, the legislature and this Court have adopted the inclusionary 
2 
rule. 
This approach differs from the more traditional exclusion-
ary rule. The major criticism against the exclusionary approach 
1. McCormick on Evidence (Cleary) 2nd Ed. 1972 p. 447. 
2. Boyce, Evidence of Other Crimes or Wron doin . 5 Utah Bar Jnl. 
p. 37 (Summer ; State v. Harries, Uta 260, 221 P.2d 605 
(1950); State v. Dixon, 12 Utah Zd 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1953)! State v. ~. 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969); State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 
ZdJ2"6, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972). 
- 5 -
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is the rigidity of the rule itself. It requires the party offering 
evidence of other crimes to be able to pigeonhole the offer into one 
of the specifically enumerated exceptions. 3 
In Utah, the application of the inclusionary rule is base( 
upon Rules 4S and SS, Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule SS specifically 
states: 
Subject to Rule 4S evidence that a person com-
mitted a crime or civil wrong on a specified 
occasion, is inadmissible to prove his dis-
position to cormnit crime or civil wrong as the 
basis for an inference that he cormnitted another 
crime or civil wrong on another specified 
occasion but, subject to Rules 4S and 48, such 
evidence is admissible when relevant to rove--
some ot er materia act inc u ing a sence o 
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, 
yreparation, plan knowledge or identity. 
Emphasis Supplied] 
Rule 45 provides: 
Except as in these rules otherwise provided, 
the judge may in his discretion exclude evidence 
if he finds that its probative value is substan-
tiall outwei hed b the risk that its adiriission 
wil a necessitate undue consumption o time, 
Qr""Tb) create substantial dan er of undue re·u-
dice or o con using t e issues or o mis ea ing 
the"°jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise 
a party who has not had reasonable opportunity 
to anticipate that such evidence would be offered. 
[Emphasis Supplied] 
Thus the current application of Rule 5S, Utah Rules of 
Evidence is an inclusionary rule based primarily upon the relevancy 
of the evidence offered and the discretion of the trial court as 
stated in Rule 4S. 
3. Ibid. Boyce p. 33-34. 
- 6 -
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However, adoption of the generally preferred rule is 
not without pitfalls. Concentration on relevancy of the offered 
evidence alone ignores the varying degrees of prejudice caused by 
the offer. Thus again Rule 45 comes into play by requiring a 
balancing test of probative worth against prejudicial effect. 
Whichever rule is applied, the "balancing test" of Rule 45 is the 
appellant's only guarantee against prejudice. The appellant 
submits this amorphous standard requires greater definition by this 
Court. 
The problem of leaving all balancing to the discretion 
of the trial court is best summarized in 70 Yale Law Journal 763, 
at 769: 
Whichever form of the rule is followed, the 
"balancing test" becomes the chief barrier 
against the use of prejudicial other crimes 
evidence. The statement of this test gives 
it an attractive simplicity: "probative 
worth" is weighed against "tendency to 
prejudice." Difficulties of aaplication may 
be swe t under the car et of 11 iscretion" 
oun in a oo tria courts. Un ortunatel 
the tria ju ~e must e arme wit more than 
discretion an a formula to a 1 the test 
correct y. Emphasis Supp 
McCormick on Evidence also cites the problem of the trial 
court's discretion. McCormick states: 
Such a balancing calls for a large ~easure.of 
individual judgment about.the relative ~a~ity 
of imponderables. Accordin~ly, some opinions 
stress the element of discretion. It should 
be recognized, however, that thi~ i~ not a 
discretion to depart from the principle that. 
evidence of other crimes, having no substantial 
relevancy except to ground the inference that 
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that the accused is a bad man and hence probably 
committed this crime, must be excluded. The 
leewa of discretion lies rather in the o~-osite 
irection, empowering t e JU ge to exc u e the 
other-crimes evidence, even when it has substan-
tial independent relevancy. . . [Emphasis 
Supplied] McCormick on Evidence (Cleary) 2nd 
Ed. (1972) p. 
The problem of discretion versus the mechanical operation 
of Rule 55 is further complicated by the difficult concepts of 
probative worth and prejudicial effect. Probative value is more 
than logical relevance or pursuasiveness. No matter how persuasive 
the evidence offered, it has no probative value if the fact it is 
supposed to prove is not in issue. Many courts have extended this 
proposition to prohibit introduction of evidence on issues conceded 
4 
by the defendant or issues impossible to dispite. This adds 
"necessity" as an element of probative worth. 
The best example of the necessity test is State v. Gillig< 
92 Conn. 526, 103 A. 649 (1918). In that case the Connecticut 
Supreme Court held that other crimes evidence of intent could not 
be admitted in a homicide case where poisoning was unequivally 
intentional. The Court added that the State could use the prior 
convictions in rebuttal if the defendant specifically placed intent 
in issue, for example, by claiming accident. 
The principle of necessity should have similar applicatio: 
where the State's evidence is overwhelming on a disputed issue. Jn 
such a case prejudice only results when the State is allowed to 
4. 70 Yale Law Journal 763, at 770. 
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introduce the additional evidence of other crimes. Thus as a matter 
of law this Court should dictate that the prejudicial effect of 
other crimes evidence outweighs the probative value where a disputed 
issue is established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
As in the instant case, there was no legitimate issue of 
identity. The State's main witnesses all established the presence 
of the appellant in the area of the cabins. Thus, only the State 
would benefit by the prejudice it caused in introducing other alleged 
criminal activity by the appellant. 
The appellant concedes this requires an early factual 
determination. However, this is the present practice in cases where 
intent evidence is excluded in "unequivocally intentional" crimes. 
The appellant further submits that adoption of the 
"necessity test" would not substantially alter the partys' positions 
at trial. The State still has the ability to use other crimes 
evidence in rebuttal, when a material issue becomes disputed. The 
defendant still has the onerous decision whether to testify. The 
defendant is still open to impeachment by his previous criminal 
acts. The appellant seeks only to change the procedure of admitting 
evidence of other crimes. 
In the instant case, the State was intially allowed to 
introduce evidence of other crimes to show intent and modus operendi 
(R. 52). Later the Court expanded its decision to include 
.. intent or plan or motive or modus operendi, nothing else" 
(R 57). Still later, during defense counsel's motion to strike 
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the evidence was allowed "to show commonality of a plan, the 
absence of mistake ... motive, opportunity . intent" (R. 158). 
Thus what started as evidence of intent and modus operendi 
ended by including opportunity, motive, absence of mistake, and a 
general plan. This is indicative of the confusion surrounding 
admissibility of evidence of other crimes. The result in this case 
was the trial court accepted all the evidence of other crimes and 
pigeonholed the evidence into Rule 55. The appellant submits the 
proper approach would evaluate the necessity of such evidence and 
limit its introduction to those issues genuinely in dispute. 
CONCLUSION 
The underlying principal throughout appellant's brief is 
a sincere attempt to safeguard an accused from the character smear 
thzit results from evidence of other crimes. ~:c prejudicial effoct 
is overwhelming. Prosecuting attorneys are aware of the pragmatic 
effects of introducing such evidence. The appellant seeks only to 
require the State to use its best and most direct evidence before 
introducing the explosive evidence of other criminal acts. Adoption1 
and application of the "necessity test" will insure this result. 
Since this type of prejudicial evidence was admitted in the appellan1 
trial, the conviction should be set aside and the case remanded for i 
a new trial. I 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRAD RICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
- 10 -
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